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Constructivism in the International Relations literature mainly focuses
on the constitutive interaction between international norms and state
actions. Few studies explore when ideas at the domestic level matter in
foreign policy change. I propose a constructivist account for policy
change that emphasizes not only ideas but also material interests as
exogenous factors constituted within domestic structures. My empirical
analysis in the case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Devel-
opment Agency reveals important evidence demonstrating the influence
of (i) shared normative values, mostly constituted by the foreign policy
elite’s intersubjective understanding of Turkey’s historical roots and cul-
tural ties in the region and (ii) material interests, favored through the
“trading state” and framed by the convergence of principled and causal
beliefs on policy change. Ideas matter in foreign policymaking when a
set of contingent conditions is satisfied: (i) A small group of recognized
foreign policy elite has shared normative beliefs and (ii) an enabling
political environment exists, particularly a majority government facilitat-
ing foreign policy appointments to key positions so that a window of
opportunity is provided for policy entrepreneurship.
There is growing literature on the role of ideas in International Relations but
the conditions under which ideas influence foreign policy change are understud-
ied. Constructivism treats ideas as structural factors and considers the dynamic
relationship between ideas and material forces (Adler 2002). However, construc-
tivist scholars mainly focus on international norms and rules and the constitutive
interaction between norms and state actions. Few studies explore when ideas at
the domestic level matter in foreign policy change, and thus, this study attempts
to fill this empirical gap. I consider the role of ideas as an explanatory variable
and argue that a specific set of conditions at the domestic level are required for
ideational influence to constitute normative values and material interests in
foreign policy.
The pioneering studies focusing on how ideas influence foreign policy under-
line how the significance of the domestic context specifies the process for policy
change. For example, Risse-Kappen’s (1994) seminal study explaining the end of
the Cold War stresses the importance of a state’s domestic structures in deter-
mining the conditions under which particular ideas of the “epistemic communi-
ties” in international organizations or transnational networks lead foreign policy
change. Other scholars highlight the institutional conditions under which ideas
persist and thus determine policy (Hall 1989; Sikkink 1991; Goldstein and
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Keohane 1993; Woods 1995; Finnemore 1996; Checkel 1997). Recent studies
elaborate on causal mechanisms linking ideas to foreign policy (Ozkececi-Taner
2005; Dueck 2006; Flibbert 2006; Ashizawa 2008; Hook 2008; Kitchen 2010).
This study contributes to the constructivist literature by specifying causal
mechanisms and contingent conditions for ideational influence on foreign pol-
icy. It also bridges material interests in rational models and ideational forces to
bring a plausible explanation for foreign policy change. For my empirical investi-
gation of when ideas matter in foreign policymaking, I select the case of the
Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). There is
growing interest in explaining Turkey’s foreign policy transformation and its
increasing visibility in the greater region. TIKA, established in 1992, has consid-
erably expanded the volume and geographic scope of its assistance since 2004.
As of 2010, TIKA’s 28 program coordination offices operate in 25 countries,
covering the Balkans, Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (TIKA 2011). Its
official development assistance (ODA) exceeded 900 million dollars in 2010,
ranking Turkey third among non- Development Assistance Committee (DAC)1
countries for that year. Thus, the observed increase in TIKA activities is impor-
tant to explain policy change.
Several scholars stress systemic changes in international relations, material
interests, identity, or changing security discourses as the driving force behind
Turkey’s foreign policy transformation. The role of ideas and material interests,
particularly in constituting its soft power as a foreign instrument, is mostly
ignored. This study focuses on whether ideational forces and material interests
under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government have an influence
on policy change, and if so, the study attempts to identify causal mechanisms
and contingent conditions for how ideas affect Turkish foreign policy.
In the first section, I review the literature around ideas and foreign policy.
Then, I discuss alternative explanations of foreign policy change for the selected
case study. Next, I describe my theoretical approach and identify causal mecha-
nisms to explain the role of ideas as independent agents of foreign policy
change together with material interests within domestic structures. In the second
section, I demonstrate the findings in terms of the influence of ideas and mate-
rial interests in constituting Turkey’s soft power via TIKA activities. The third sec-
tion discusses when ideas matter for foreign policy change. The last section
concludes and emphasizes the context-dependent conditions for the influence
of ideas on foreign policy.
Ideas and Foreign Policy
Goldstein and Keohane argue that “ideas define the universe of possibilities for
action” (1993:8). They define ideas as “beliefs held by individuals” (1993:3).
However, the question of how ideas function as a source for foreign policymak-
ing underlines the premise of ideational forces in explaining foreign policy
change.
Risse-Kappen (1994) emphasizes that the change in Soviet foreign policy in
the late 1980s was due to a match between the ideas of “new thinkers” in trans-
national networks and the winning domestic coalitions. The winning coalitions
responded, however, differently to those ideas, depending on their domestic
structures, which in turn had been determined by political institutions,
1 The OECD DAC is an international forum of the world’s largest funders of aid. Turkey is not a DAC member
but has full observer status. Among non-DAC countries in 2010, Saudi Arabia ranked first (3.48 billion USD), China
ranked second (with an estimated 2 billion USD), and Turkey third (967.4 million USD). OECD (2011), Develop-
ment: Key Tables from OECD, No. 1. doi: 10.1787/aid-oda-table-2011-1-en.
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state–society relations, and the values and norms embedded in the state’s politi-
cal culture (Risse-Kappen 1994:186–187).
Dueck (2006) expands a systematic account of classical realism, claiming that
the key independent variable of structural realism, namely the distribution of
power, has not changed throughout various strategic adjustments of American
foreign policy. His findings suggest that distinctive strategic cultures in foreign
policymaking are more important than structural changes. Kitchen (2010) also
underlines an important deficiency in neorealism, which is ignorance about
ideological foreign policy. The author calls his approach “neoclassical” in an
attempt “to establish a common intervening variable—the role of strategic
ideas”—that combines the structural elements of the international system and
domestic and ideational factors of the domestic system for foreign policy analysis
(Kitchen 2010:119).
Despite Kitchen’s (2010:213) criticism of constructivism that it reduces inter-
ests in ideas and ignores material capabilities, I argue that ideas and material
interests both matter in constructivist analysis of foreign policy. Constructivism is
not only useful to understand the formation of identities, the influence of identi-
ties, norms and values on state behavior, and social learning about how actors
change their identities and/or diverge in their preferences, but it also contrib-
utes to the debate on when ideas and material interests matter.
For example, Flibbert’s (2006) study focuses on why the Iraq War was part of
US foreign policy. He argues that the ideas of a small group of “policy intellectu-
als” affected the course of policymaking in terms of its purpose, threat percep-
tions, and the proper solutions to and political instruments for the core
problems, which in turn constituted the American interest in war. He attempts
to elaborate on causal mechanisms for when ideas matter in foreign policy and
finds that ideas can be causally prior to defining a foreign policy choice. He
specifies several hypotheses to explain the contingent conditions for the power
of ideas in foreign policy (Flibbert 2006:349–352). His conclusion draws atten-
tion to the importance of ideas and material interests in shaping political out-
comes. In short, actors constitute their interests depends on mutual constitution
of ideas and material interests.
Other empirical studies investigating the role of ideas in foreign policymaking
underscore the contingent conditions for ideational influence. For example,
Ozkececi-Taner (2005:270) posits that such conditions include the nature of a
government (coalition or majority) and characteristics of the actors (or coalition
partners) in foreign policymaking. However, the “relevant ministerial position”
and the “ministry tak[ing] part in actual policymaking” must coincide with a sug-
gested window of opportunity for the shared normative ideas to have an effect.
Ozkececi-Taner (2005) focuses on the impact of “institutionalized ideas” in coali-
tion foreign policymaking with Turkey as a case study. Similarly, Hook’s (2008)
study emphasizes the importance of “an enabling institutional environment” to
embed, and “domestic structures” to filter, principled and causal beliefs as
exogenous factors in foreign policymaking.
I apply Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) theoretical approach to ideas as inde-
pendent agents of foreign policy change to determine the conditions under
which they matter in constructing a foreign policy instrument, namely soft power
via the selected case of TIKA activities. Ideas shape foreign policy agendas
because they are “a condition for reasoned discourse” (Goldstein and Keohane
1993:11). Ideas are conceptualized as principled and causal beliefs in their study.
Principled beliefs are normative ideas that determine criteria for understanding
what is right or wrong and just or unjust (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:9); in
politics, such ideas can translate major principles into policy guidance. Causal
beliefs reflect strategies about how to achieve goals, given the normative
PINAR IPEK 175
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/11/2/173/1806675/Ideas-and-Change-in-Foreign-Policy-Instruments
by Bilkent University Library (BILK) user
on 28 September 2017
principles that they reflect (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:10).2 In other words,
causal beliefs help determine which of many means would be used to reach pol-
icy goals. However, a strategy is selected when it is appealing according to the
principled beliefs, which are essential to evaluate structural environment and to
frame problems.
Thus, ideas matter for foreign policymaking when principled and causal
beliefs converge and clarify actors’ perceptions about how to make policy choices
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993:12–13). Such a convergence guides foreign policy
by highlighting the causal relationships between the policy goals and political
strategies chosen because of compelling ethical or moral motivations for action.
Particular policy choices are privileged over others when they are perceived as
congruent with shared principled beliefs among foreign policymakers, as well as
instrumentally optimal in policy implementation, hence driving causal beliefs.
Nye (2008:95) defines soft power in behavioral terms as attractive power, and
in resource terms as the assets that produce such attraction. He emphasizes the
importance of hard power for the effectiveness of soft power, that is, “smart
power, the ability to combine hard and soft power effectively” (Nye 2008:107).
However, for Turkey, the reflexive nature of soft power, as discussed in Bilgin
and Elis (2008), is important to understand how foreign policymakers’ princi-
pled beliefs shape their awareness and understanding of Turkey’s self-identifica-
tion and thus operationalize its soft power. Weber, as discussed in Hall
(1993:48), posits that ultimately ideas affect social reality: “Not ideas, but mate-
rial and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the
‘world images’ that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined
the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.”
Thus, ideas and material interests alike should be considered in the social con-
struction of soft power.
To date, there is no agreement on the causality of ideas in political processes
(Yee 1996:71–82; Kitchen 2010:127). Nevertheless, two major features about the
role of ideational forces in foreign policy should be noted. First, ideas do not act
alone; they need agency to make things happen. Structure and agency, however,
cannot be distinguished so it is difficult to identify precise causality about which
one dominates the other. Although it can be said that structures and agents are
ontologically inseparable, scholars may analytically treat them as if they are dis-
tinct (Legro 2000:423). Thus, this study’s theoretical approach confirms Marsh’s
(2009:680) and Kitchen’s (2010:128) positions on keeping ideational and mate-
rial forces separate to analyze how ideas and material interests matter. It differs
from Kitchen’s (2010) core realist principles, however, which emphasize that the
nature of the international system is anarchic and that the major tool of states is
power, effectively utilized by material capabilities. Rather, I posit that the extent
to which material and ideational factors explain a particular foreign policy out-
come is an empirical question. The relationship between ideational and material
forces is mutually constitutive. Ideas provide the social context within which
agents frame material interests, share norms and values, and practice material
capabilities, and they are constrained by the material. Then, agents develop ideas
to reinterpret the social context and change those material constraints, and so it
continues.
Second, policymakers’ intersubjective understanding of a state’s self-identity
matters in foreign policy analysis. Identities, discourses, norms, and institutions
are embedded in historically configured state–society relations (Hopf 2002:
2 Goldstein and Keohane (1993:8) define a third belief: world views, which “are embedded in the symbolism of
a culture and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse.” In their study, foreign policymakers’ world views are
assumed because principled beliefs translate world views into guidance for policy choice. Therefore, I assume that
foreign policymakers’ world views are reflected in their principled beliefs.
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278–83). Furthermore, how ideational forces function as a source of foreign pol-
icy is dependent on domestic structures (Risse-Kappen 1994; Katzenstein 1996;
Hopf 2002). I seek causal connections between ideas and policy outcomes by
correlating particular ideas with a particular behavior in a particular policy con-
text. However, I do not ignore the “intersubjective meaning”3 of ideas so as to
move beyond a limited cognitive approach that emphasizes only an empirical
analysis of observable behavior. An empirical investigation can focus on when
ideas matter in the foreign policy process in a material world, which shapes and
is shaped by human action, and in an interaction with the dynamic normative
and epistemic interpretations of material interests in a social context (Adler
1997:332). Thus, Kitchen’s (2010:128) criticism, which states that in “defining
ideas as beliefs we remove their power,” can be responded by constructivism.
The convergence of principled and causal beliefs constitutes political practices
and politically relevant ideas are not formulated independently of interests and
power in a social context.
Alternative Explanations
Contesting explanations exist in the literature for the Turkish foreign policy
transformation since the end of the Cold War. The first group of studies suggests
that the major factor driving policy change stems from a change in the interna-
tional system and states adjusting to the new balance of power in international
relations (Karaosmanoglu 2000; Sayari 2000; Larrabee 2010). Sayari (2000:170–
176) calls the Turkish foreign policy changes in the Middle East and the Cauca-
sus in the 1990s “assertive activism,” a security-driven response to the emerging
political instability, war, and ethnic conflict near Turkey’s borders. In the Bal-
kans, its policy was explained as “multilateral activism,” referencing Turkey’s
efforts to adjust to changes in the international system. Similarly, Larrabee
(2010:158) argues that Turkey’s recent activism in foreign policy reflects its
efforts to adapt to its changed strategic environment in Turkey’s neighborhood
after the end of the Cold War. Despite the instability in the Middle East and the
Caucasus, the distribution of power or balance of threat has not changed signifi-
cantly between the 1990s and the 2000s. Accordingly, this first group of studies
reveals a neglected dimension: the role of ideational forces in Turkish foreign
policy and especially how ideas matter in employing its soft power.
The second group of explanations focuses on domestic politics as a determi-
nant of Turkey’s foreign policy transformation. These analyses mostly attribute
such changes to “Europeanization,” the effects of European Union (EU) condi-
tionality (criteria for the accession process to the EU; Aydin and Acikmese 2007;
Ozcan 2008). The impact of EU conditionality on Turkey is underlined in its for-
eign policy transformation from a “coercive regional power” in the 1990s to a
“benign power” in the first decade of the 2000s (Onis 2003). Other studies
examine Turkey’s domestic political developments (Duran 2006; Altunisik 2009)
and its democratization process through the growing influence of interest
groups and civil society since 1999 (Rumelili 2005).
Although similar activism in Turkish foreign policy occurred in the 1990s and
the first decade of the 2000s, and the same pragmatic reasons to expand Turkish
export markets and Turkey’s regional power status existed in both decades, the
observed difference in TIKA activities in the latter half of the 2000s is puzzling.
The amount and means of ODA and the geographic scope of TIKA activities
throughout the 2000s increased considerably (Figures 2 and 3). Thus, if strategic
calculations driven by changes in the international system or domestic politics
3 Intersubjective meanings are defined as “the product of the collective self-interpretations and self-definitions
of human communities” (Neufeld 1995:77).
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have been in play, I argue that clarifying whether material interests and/or idea-
tional forces contributed to this change is important.
The concept of soft power is widely employed by scholars and politicians to
explain the transformation in Turkey’s foreign policy (Oguzlu 2007; Altunisik
2008; Onis and Yilmaz 2009:16–18; Kalin 2011). A special issue of Insight Turkey
(2008) discusses “Turkey’s Rising Soft Power.” In this issue, Bilgin and Elis scruti-
nize Nye’s (1990, 2004) soft power concept through critical approaches underly-
ing soft power’s reflexive nature, which requires a consideration of “how
different actors’ needs and wants as well as their understanding of themselves
and ‘their real interests’ are shaped by other actors or by existing structures”
(Bilgin and Elis 2008:14). Beng (2008), on the other hand, questions Turkey’s
ability to exert soft power in its turbulent neighborhood and argues for the need
to conceptually clarify Turkey’s self-identification and to determine to what
extent others legitimize such reification of soft power. Altinay (2008) emphasizes
Turkey’s potential soft power ability but makes it conditional on the political
and foreign policy elites’ awareness of it. In light of this discussion and alterna-
tive explanations, a theoretical framework to analyze the role of ideational forces
in constructing policy change is highly relevant.
Principled and Causal Beliefs and Material Interests in Foreign Policy
My constructivist analysis incorporates foreign policymakers’ ideas as an explana-
tory variable to posit a plausible explanation for policy change. The dependent
variable is policy change, conceptualized in terms of constituting soft power as a
foreign policy change and measured in terms of increasing TIKA’s ODA by year
and region. The convergence of normative principles and political strategies is
important to achieve policy change. While principled beliefs define the social
purpose of policy change by evaluating the structural environment and framing
problems or threats, causal beliefs identify opportunities and prescribe policy in
line with material interests (Flibbert 2006:328). Ideas are incorporated analyti-
cally prior to interests to deconstruct material interests. Certain beliefs with
enough force delimit the sphere of possible political and material interests (Wel-
des 1999; Wendt 1999). Therefore, the convergence of principled and causal
beliefs is set in a dialectical relationship between domestic structures and mate-
rial interests. Accordingly, the independent variables are ideas and material
interests (Figure 1). Domestic structures are “mediating variable” (Hook
2008:152), within which policymakers frame material interests according to
principled beliefs, practice material capabilities, and are constrained. Various
studies reveal the importance of “leading state officials” (Dueck 2006) or “policy
elite” (Checkel 1997; Kaltenthaler 2002) or “a handful of policy intellectuals”
(Flibbert 2006) in demonstrating the causal relevance of ideas in a domestic












FIG 1. Ideational Influences on Policy Change
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ideational forces into agent-based and materially constrained causal mechanisms.
In other words, the policy elite define social purpose, evaluate the structural
environment, and frame material interests according to normative principles,
which in turn converge with causal beliefs to identify opportunities and prescribe
policy instruments. Therefore, in this study, I analyze the following proposition:
Hypothesis: A convergence of principled and causal beliefs reflecting the ideas of a core
group of decision makers will constitute soft power as a foreign policy instrument by
advancing normative values and material interests in a social context.
Empirical Analysis: Ideational Forces and Change in TIKA Activities
The TIKA is a unique case to explain the role of ideas and material interests
in Turkey’s foreign policy change. Turkey’s use of soft power through TIKA is
important because of bilateral development assistance’s nature as an instru-
ment of public diplomacy and foreign policy. I use the methodology of process
tracing to examine how ideas matter in foreign policy. While I consider alter-
native explanations to avoid equifinality, I focus on context-dependent mecha-
nisms to determine empirical explanations rather than generalizable recurring
patterns of behavior. Accordingly, I trace the agency’s history, particularly of a
small group of foreign policymakers, to identify under which conditions their
ideas enter into the policy arena and, together with material interests, open a
space for ideationally driven change in foreign policy. I collected data from
TIKA’s annual reports between 1992 and 2010, evaluated articles by senior for-
eign policymakers and TIKA directors published in different journals, and con-
ducted interviews with TIKA officers.4 I trace evidence for the convergence of
principled and causal beliefs that match the foreign policy elite’s normative
ideas presented elsewhere and the particular policy choices made under con-
tingent conditions together with material interests, which in turn resulted in
molding TIKA activities as an instrument of soft power throughout that time
period.
Change in TIKA Activities
Turkish assistance to foreign countries began after its contribution to the UN’s
multilateral technical assistance program in 1957.5 Turkey’s early bilateral assis-
tance was limited in amount and geographic scope. In 1992, an agency to plan,
coordinate, and implement development assistance was established in the after-
math of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the consequent changes in the
immediate environment of Turkish foreign policy. In 2001, it was renamed as
the TIKA and restructured under the supervision of the Prime Ministry (Parlak
2007:129–130).
Changes in TIKA activities can be summarized into three major periods:
(i) the early period, from its establishment in 1992 till May 2001 (when its
administrative status changed); (ii) the transition period, from 2001 till 2004
(when Turkey’s development assistance was harmonized with the DAC’s rules of
classification and reporting); and (iii) the late period, from 2004 until 2010. The
late period is puzzling because there is a significant change in the volume and
4 I kept the names of interviewees anonymous and referred to them by numbers because they are government
officials and required to have permission from the head of their organization to give an interview that might be
published. I intentionally avoided this official procedure to facilitate an environment of trust and flexibility for the
interviewees so that they would feel no hesitation for any bureaucratic reason.
5 Turkey’s bilateral technical assistance was first offered to Iran and Pakistan in 1971 according to Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Regional Cooperation for Development agreements.
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means of TIKA’s ODA and in its geographic scope (Parlak 2007; TIKA Annual
Reports 2004–2010; see Figures 2 and 3). For example, between 1992 and 1996,
the Central Asia–Caucasus region had the highest share of Turkey’s total ODA
(86.5%). Between 1997 and 2003, the amount declined to 40% of that because
of the shift in focus to reconstruction and humanitarian efforts in the Balkans–
Eastern Europe region after the ethnic wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (1993–1995
and 1998–1999, respectively; Parlak 2007:74,79). Economic interests in energy
resources, pipeline projects in the Central Asia–Caucasus region, and the ethnic
conflict in the Balkans threatening Turkey’s trade relations were major issues
shaping TIKA’s agenda in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Turkey’s ODA declined shar-
ply in 1992 and remained relatively low until 2004 because of major economic
crises in the 1990s and 2001.
Most of TIKA’s ODA since 2001 has continued to focus on the Central Asia–
Caucasus and the Balkans–Eastern Europe regions, although since 2004 an
increasing share has been allotted to the Middle East and Africa regions (see
Figure 3). Accordingly, the change in TIKA activities by region and amount of
ODA could be attributed to (i) a change in Turkey’s material capabilities
because of a change in the international system and geopolitics after the end of
the Cold War or (ii) a change in domestic politics and economic interests, as dis-











FIG 2. Turkey’s Total Development Assistance. Source: Turkish International Cooperation and Devel-
opment Agency, TIKA Annual Reports 2004–2010 and Parlak (2007:74 and 79)
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FIG 3. Turkey’s Total Development Assistance by Regions. Source: Turkish International Cooperation
and Development Agency, TIKA Annual Reports 2004–2010
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change in the international system as a parsimonious explanation for foreign
policy change, and it does not explain the change in TIKA activities between
1992–2001 and 2004–2010, when there was no change in the international
system or the balance of power. The second argument neglects the role of
ideational forces and includes a limited account of rationally calculated material
interests. Conversely, I propose that the convergence of principled and causal
beliefs of Turkey’s new foreign policy elite appears to be the driving force
behind the change in TIKA activities, advancing normative values and material
interests to translate ideas and strategies into policy change.
Principled Beliefs and the Foreign Policy Elite
The AKP majority government was elected in Turkey in 2002 following a period
of coalition governments from 1991 to 2002, and it subsequently appointed new
foreign policymakers. The principled beliefs of a small group policy intellectuals
or foreign policy elite are detailed in Strategic Depth (2001), written by Ahmet
Davutoglu, current minister of foreign affairs. His ideas are largely shared by his
colleagues, as evident in their own writings (Fidan and Nurdun 2008; Aras and
Fidan 2009; Kalin 2011). The AKP foreign policy elite consists of (i) Davutoglu,
chief advisor on foreign affairs to Turkey’s prime minister between 2003 and
2009 and current minister of foreign affairs since 2009; (ii) Hakan Fidan, presi-
dent of TIKA between 2003 and 2006, deputy undersecretary of the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office between 2006 and 2009, deputy head of the National Intelligence
Service in 2009 and 2010, and current head of the National Intelligence Service;
and (iii) Ibrahim Kalin, chief advisor on foreign affairs to the prime minister
since 2009.
Davutoglu’s conceptualizations of Turkey’s “historical and geographic depth”
Davutoglu (2008:78–79) summarize the core of his normative ideas. Historical
and geographic depth focus on a country’s past, present, and future relations,
which are argued to be built on geocultural, geopolitical, and geoeconomic
factors at the domestic, regional, and global levels. His cohesive formulation of
strategic depth envisioned through these historical and geographic dimensions
frames his normative ideas about how soft power and a new vision for Turkey’s
foreign policy can be constructed. For example, he underlines the five opera-
tional principles (built on the principled beliefs defined in Strategic Depth
(2001)) and three methodological principles (casual beliefs) in the new foreign
policy.6 He defines the latter as (i) “a ‘visionary’ approach to the issues instead
of the ‘crisis-oriented’ attitude that dominated foreign policy during the entire
Cold War period”; (ii) a policy based on “a ‘consistent and systematic’ framework
around the world”; and (iii) “the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic
style, which has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region” (Dav-
utoglu 2010).
Davutoglu’s principled beliefs are shared and supported by a small group of
foreign policy elite and define social purpose, evaluate the structural environ-
ment, and frame problems in devising strategies for his foreign policy vision.
Aras and Fidan (2009:197) link the change in Turkish foreign policy to the
“reconstruction of the previous geographic imagination in policy-making circles”.
While the authors acknowledge the importance of strategic calculations and
material interests in the Eurasia region for Turkish foreign policymakers since
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, their argument asserts that the “new geo-
graphical imagination gave rise to novel interpretations of the Eurasian region
in the minds of foreign policymakers” (Aras and Fidan 2009:199). Similarly,
6 The operational principles consist of security and democracy, zero problems with neighbors, proactive and
preemptive peace diplomacy, a multidimensional foreign policy, and rhythmic diplomacy.
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Kalin attributes the new geographic imagination as “a new idea of time and
place [that] makes it possible for Turkey to produce its own concepts and build
a new vocabulary.” He ascribes the change to “a profound mental transforma-
tion,” praising Davutoglu’s work and policy as a narrative effort to see the world
from a non-Eurocentric perspective (Kalin 2011:6–7). In short, the principled
beliefs are translated into foreign policy goals reflecting ethical values based on
a broader narrative of the history and culture of Eurasia together with material
interests in a social context.
A Convergence of Principled and Causal Beliefs Constituting Policy Guidance
The convergence of principled and causal beliefs was essential for policy change.
The principled beliefs defined the social purpose of foreign policy by framing
Turkey’s role in historic, cultural, and geographic terms, and the causal beliefs
prescribed “a new discourse and style in spreading soft power” (Davutoglu
2010). In fact, Davutoglu (2012:5–7) endorses the principles of Turkish foreign
policy by highlighting Turkey’s quest to pursue a “value-based foreign policy”
while defending national interests in the aftermath of the uprisings in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa that began in 2010. He notes how Turkish foreign pol-
icy is shaped by major normative principles and political strategies such as
“reintegrat[ing] with its neighbors” and its “ongoing process of reconnecting
with the people in [its] region with whom [it shares] a common history and [is]
poised to have a common destiny” (Davutoglu 2012:3–4). He suggests that as
Turkey positions itself with the historic political transformation in its region, it
“requires new instruments which might be missing in Turkey’s traditional for-
eign policy toolkit” and underlines “active involvement in new areas such as
international development assistance” (Davutoglu 2012:5–6). Thus, the foreign
policy elite’s emphasis in discourse on soft power and the instruments of foreign
policy represent means about how shared normative ideas can produce a particu-
lar end.
Since 2004, TIKA’s annual reports have demonstrated the influence such idea-
tional forces have had on TIKA activities as an instrument of soft power. Full
and uninterrupted coordination between TIKA and the ministry of foreign
affairs, promoting TIKA activities as public diplomacy, and prioritizing projects
that increase Turkey’s visibility in ODA recipient countries have been high-
lighted as operational principles (TIKA 2006:3). These principles implicitly
emphasize the convergence of shared principled beliefs and causal beliefs in
constituting a foreign policy change, namely employing soft power via TIKA
activities. Former Minister of State Besir Atalay, responsible for TIKA, boldly sta-
ted its new role in foreign policy: “Our government has an awareness of how
important ODA is in foreign policy” (TIKA 2006:iv). The Turkish government
declared 2005 as “the year of Africa in Turkey,” and TIKA opened offices there
for the first time. Offices and projects in the Middle East were also prioritized
in line with the new thinking in foreign policy (TIKA 2007:2). In 2008, former
Minister of State Mustafa Said Yazicioglu elucidated TIKA’s role in Turkey’s soft
power initiatives: “TIKA has assumed responsibility for turning the increasing
number of commitments made by the government of Turkey towards Sub-
Saharan African countries, Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, etc. into concrete
projects” (TIKA 2008:5). Musa Kulaklikaya, TIKA’s former president, stated:
As a natural extension of the multi-faceted foreign policy that is effective in all
regions and reconciles the East with the West, and the North with the South,
Turkey, which is an active member of the current global community, is increas-
ingly supporting this global phase by increasing…the effectiveness of TIKA in the
area of development cooperation (TIKA 2008:7).
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And:
TIKA’s development assistance projects implemented in partnership with the
Republic of Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs have played an important role in
securing non-permanent member status for Turkey with an extremely high rate
of 151 out of 192 country votes in the first round at the UN Security Council,
and as such, TIKA has befittingly executed its responsibility within the priorities
of foreign policy (TIKA 2009:3).
The convergence of principled beliefs and causal beliefs affect foreign policy
under specific conditions. An opportunity created by a major change in domes-
tic politics (the majority government of the AKP after a decade of coalition
governments in Turkey) was crucial to facilitate support from key decision mak-
ers and to allocate the required level of resource commitment. Thus, while the
principled beliefs of the foreign policy elite interpreted the structural and discur-
sive context embedded in domestic structures to constitute soft power, their cau-
sal beliefs prescribed policies to transform normative values and material
interests into soft power via TIKA’s activities.
Top-level bureaucrats at TIKA confirm such a transformation, stressing that “a
new foreign policy vision pursued by the current government played a major
role in the expansion of ODA” (Kulaklikaya and Nurdun 2010:139). Further,
during the Turgut Ozal government between 1983 and 1989 there was also for-
eign policy activism; however, an agency to plan, coordinate and implement Tur-
key’s development assistance was established in 1992. TIKA’s potential could not
be utilized through the 1990s. In 1999, when there was a coalition government,
the Nationalist Movement Party recognized the importance of TIKA, given its
ideological and political interests in the Central Asia-Caucasus region. Therefore,
TIKA was restructured as an independent organization under the prime ministry
in 2001, but the coalition government was short lived. It was after the majority
government of AKP in 2003 that a vision of foreign policy was enacted in which
TIKA had a role from the beginning. Mr. Davutoglu and Mr. Fidan worked clo-
sely together to transform TIKA activities into instruments of soft power.7
Other officers at TIKA confirmed the convergence of principled and causal
beliefs observed during close cooperation between Fidan and Davutoglu in
expanding TIKA activities to new regions. Davutoglu held many meetings at
TIKA, sharing his foreign policy vision and explaining how TIKA activities would
be supplementary to Turkey’s soft power efforts.8 Thus, these meetings were
important to disseminate the shared normative ideas of the foreign policy elite
and the corresponding strategies to shape TIKA activities for policy change.
Further, one project coordinator noted that
[t]he change in TIKA activities is not conjectural; we closed our eyes to Africa and
the Middle East in the 1990s. For example, the founding legislation of 1992, which
established TIKA, starts with the phrase “the Turkish republics and the fraternal
communities,” limiting and reflecting the priorities to a regional focus. This phrase
is replaced only later to cover “all developing countries.” The understanding has
changed since Mr. Fidan at TIKA and Mr. Davutoglu at the prime ministry have
worked closely. The government and the politicians supported this new vision
because they want outcomes. In comparison, the ambassadors have been more cau-
tious and most of them did not have a shared understanding of the role of TIKA.
However, TIKA and the ministry of foreign affairs started to share a common
agenda with the AKP government in time. Some ambassadors familiar with TIKA
7 Author’s interview with a senior director at TIKA on March 9, 2012 in Ankara.
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supported regional expansion into the Middle East; for example, in Iraq. Now
ambassadors call us and inform us about the need for TIKA projects.9
One officer considered the “cooperation between Davutoglu and Fidan as a
chance for TIKA [to translate shared principled beliefs into policy guidance]
because they share the same vision.”10 Similarly, other project coordinators empha-
sized the political outcomes of TIKA activities on soft power and foreign policy:
It appears that we build bridges or drill water wells to provide simple technical
assistance. However, we have a good understanding of and share a similar culture
with the people in the field and this allows close relationships in the region both
at the government level and at the civil society level. The new foreign policy
vision understood this potential. Wherever the prime minister or foreign minister
visits in the Middle East, or Africa, or the Balkans, there will be an opening cere-
mony for a facility built by TIKA’s ODA.11
And:
Now people in Africa call us “their white men.” The visibility of TIKA has
increased tremendously. There is great sympathy from the people in these
regions to TIKA, and so too to Turkey.12
In summary, the above examples illustrate that the convergence of principled
and causal beliefs under the leadership of the foreign policy elite is causally
prior to explaining policy change together with material interests, which is dis-
cussed in the next subsection. Ideas matter in foreign policy when normative val-
ues (defining social purpose, evaluating material constraints, framing problems)
and political strategies (identifying opportunities, prescribing specific choices,
securing required resources) converge within the context of domestic structures
and material interests. Accordingly, a set of contingent conditions is important
to turn a core group of foreign policy elite’s ideas into strategies that result in
policy change. In the Turkish case, the conditions were the majority government
of the AKP and the foreign policy elite’s access to key decision makers, particu-
larly Prime Minister Erdogan.
Material Interests and TIKA Activities
Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency has been regularly
publishing reports on total development assistance according to the classification
rules determined by the DAC since 2004.13 Total development assistance
includes ODA, other official assistance, private flows, and support to NGOs.
Accordingly, there are four new reporting areas for ODA: private flows (direct
investment made by Turkish entrepreneurs in developing countries), Turkish
peacebuilding activities, expenditures for refugees, and contributions to the
Millennium Development Goals (TIKA 2007; Fidan and Nurdun 2008:98–101).
In fact, Turkey’s recent significant economic growth, increased trade with and
investment volume in all neighboring countries, and improved relations with
9 Author’s interview with project coordinator #1 at TIKA on March 9, 2012 in Ankara.
10 Author’s interview with an officer at TIKA on March 9, 2012 in Ankara.
11 Author’s interview with project coordinator #2 at TIKA on March 9, 2012 in Ankara.
12 Author’s interview with project coordinator #1 at TIKA on March 9, 2012 in Ankara.
13 Between 1992 and 1996, the State Planning Organization classified Turkey’s development assistance into four
groups: (i) technical assistance, (ii) humanitarian aid, (iii) economic aid and cooperation, and (iv) cultural and sci-
entific cooperation. However, Turkey’s contribution to multilateral development agencies was not accounted for,
and there was no separation between donations and loans. Between 1997 and 2002, the State Statistics Institute, on
the other hand, considered Turkey’s total development assistance as donations, ODA, and multilateral development
assistance.
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Greece, Iraq, and Syria in the 2000s have been credited to its apparent ability to
increase foreign policy activism between Eurasia and Europe during the AKP era
(Onis and Yilmaz 2009:19). Thus, the importance of material interests should
not be ignored. As discussed in the theoretical framework of this study, the con-
vergence of principled and causal beliefs do not occur in a vacuum. Ideas pro-
vide the social context within which the foreign policy elite share principled
beliefs, frame material interests, and practice material capabilities, and they are
constrained by the material world. Ideational forces are important to reinterpret
the social context and change the material constraints of foreign policy.
Kirisci (2009) explains the relationship between economic factors and foreign
policy through the concepts of the “trading state” and “two-level diplomatic
games.” For example, the “zero problems with neighbors” principle in foreign
policy becomes vital in diplomatic negotiations and in promoting economic
interests because the trading state interacts with a wide range of actors in
national constituencies for foreign policymaking. Kirisci argues that the zero-
problems policy can be considered “a blue-print manifestation of the foreign
policy of a trading state” (Kirisci 2009:42); nevertheless, he acknowledges that
none of the principles in Davutoglu’s foreign policy makes direct reference to
economic interests. Kirisci introduces the concept of interdependence function-
ing as a market-seeking instrument in addition to using conflict-resolution and
peacebuilding tools to explain how a trading state advocates foreign policy activ-
ism. He compares Turkey’s current foreign policy activism with the Ozal govern-
ment’s liberal market policies of the 1980s and concludes that the latter led to
the emergence of strong business interest groups that initiated Turkey’s rise as a
trading state in the 2000s, thus shaping its foreign policy activism.
Despite Kirisci’s argument, business interest groups’ priorities in terms of
trade expansion by region changed in the 2000s. A closer examination of
Turkey’s export and import orientation by region from 1990 to 2010 demon-
strates that penetration into the Middle East and Africa regions only began after
2003. Since the Customs Union Agreement in 1995, Turkey’s trade with the EU
has increased steadily. Although the EU countries continue to be Turkey’s major
export market, Turkey has a large trade deficit with the EU and a trade surplus
with the Middle East and Africa (see Figures 4 and 5). In other words, trade rela-
tions with the Middle East and Africa were insignificant through the 1990s but
have become important because of Turkey’s increasing trade surplus with them
since 2003.
A comparison of exports by region between two eras, 1990–2001 and 2002–
2010, highlights the rapid increase in exports to the Middle East and Africa dur-
ing the latter period, since the AKP government has been in power.14 Moreover,
while the EU’s share in Turkey’s total exports has declined from 63.1% in 2002
to 49.5% in 2010, the Middle East’s share has increased from 10.5% in 2002 to
21.8% in 2010. While the share of exports to Africa is relatively smaller in total
exports (6.6% in 2010), exports to Africa have increased considerably. Between
2002 and 2010, the exports to the Middle East and Africa have increased 77.5%
and 74.7%, respectively. Thus, the Middle East and Africa have the highest
increase in exports compared to other regions. Accordingly, while market open-
ings in the CIS after the dissolution of the Soviet Union played a role in increas-
ing exports to that region between 1990 and 2001, the significant increase in
14 For example, the EU was the largest export market for Turkey in both eras. However, the increase in exports
to the EU was 167% between 1990 and 2001 and 158% between 2002 and 2010. On the other hand, the highest
increase in exports was to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries between 1990 and 2001
(273%) and the Middle East between 2002 and 2010 (578%). The second- and third-ranked regions in terms of
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exports to the Middle East and Africa between 2002 and 2010 requires further
examination. Therefore, I analyze the relationship between ideational forces and
material interests within the context of domestic structures in explaining the
change in TIKA activities.
Although Turkey’s trade relations have been a factor in foreign policymaking
since the end of its import substitution policy and the beginning of export-led
growth model in the 1980s, the turning point for policy change was the conver-
gence of strategies to advance normative values and material interests according
to the principled beliefs embedded in the new foreign policy vision under the
AKP government. Those beliefs defined the social purpose and implicitly legiti-
mized the criteria for expansion into new markets in “an integrated foreign pol-
icy” approach. For example, Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s so-called new foreign
policy kit (Davutoglu 2012:5) and methodological principles (causal beliefs;
Davutoglu 2010) have reshaped state and societal actors’ material interests and
allowed them to benefit from those ideas. Similarly, Kalin (2011:8), chief foreign
policy advisor to the prime minister, considers “Turkey’s soft power different
from that of other countries in its form and content” because of “the cultural
and historical experience it inherited”. He does acknowledge, however, that
“Turkey’s achievement of an effective soft power status depends on its ability to
mobilize these dynamics” (Kalin 2011:10–11). The expanded volume and
geographic scope of TIKA activities since 2004, therefore, serve to constitute
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FIG 5. Turkey’s Imports by Regions, 1990–2010. Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade Statistics by
Countries
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The role of societal actors in supporting specific causal beliefs is important to
understand the relationship between the ideational forces and material interests
influencing a foreign policy change.15 Through the integration of business orga-
nizations and think tanks, Aras and Fidan consider civil society’s input into the
foreign policy-making process part of “the new geographical imagination in poli-
cymaking circles” (2009:198). Moreover, Davutoglu (1994) has explicitly acknowl-
edged the business community as a central driver in foreign policy. The
emergence of a new business class (the “Anatolian Tigers”) in Anatolia’s major
industrial cities also indicates support for the change in foreign policy (Hale
2000; Ayata 2004; Vardan 2010; Atli 2011:116). Omer Cihan Vardan, president of
the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD; essen-
tially the business association for the Anatolian Tigers) states that
[when the] AKP came to power with a majority in 2002, it was the starting point
for Turkey, [bringing] greater value in different aspects. … [Through] the cor-
rect political choices made by the ruling party [to gain] internal economic and
political stability, Turkey has obtained the identity of being a rising star in inter-
national arenas in recent years. … We should always keep in mind the fact that
domestic and foreign policy are attached to each other with steel ropes (Vardan
2010:9).
Thus, as the Anatolian Tigers increasingly conduct business in new regions,
they seek a new dynamism to support Turkey’s export potential.16 Vardan clearly
expressed this demand of the business community and praised the new foreign
policy activism by implicitly underlining the convergence of principled and cau-
sal beliefs under the AKP government, in which the material interests of societal
actors also benefited.
… [T]here was the need to convert this potential to “kinetic” by using the right
political methodology and tools. Creating Turkey’s economic stability and [cor-
rectly managing its] foreign policy [has contributed to its rise].
… [T]he reality that we mentioned above has been put forward by Prof. Ahmet
Davutoglu in his work called Strategic Depth and he did not only make an intel-
lectual and academic contribution by this, but also, firstly as the foreign policy
advisor to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and then as the
Foreign Minister himself, he implemented the ideas that he asserted. It is essen-
tial that these ideas are accepted and appreciated especially by his Excellency our
President Mr. Abdullah Gul and our Prime Minister Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
and their dedicated team (Vardan 2010:11).
In Turkey’s domestic politics, then, the shared principled and causal beliefs of
the foreign policy elite are not formulated independently of interest and power.
Legitimizing political and economic practices, TIKA’s expansion into the Middle
East and Africa can be considered a function of ideas, shifting the focus to
Turkey’s soft power activities, and reinterpreting material constraints in foreign
policy. Kalin (2011:7) emphasizes the merger between “the new geopolitical
imagination” and Turkey’s economic and security priorities, and states that
15 Since 2007, TIKA has increased its support to Turkish NGOs operating abroad, and in 2009 founded its
Cooperation and Coordination Unit to institutionalize NGO activities.
16 Turkey can increase its exports by 30% under current conditions, and the Middle East is a major market in
terms of demand for a wide spectrum of Turkey’s competitive export products compared to other regions (Dis Tic-
aret Mustesarligi (Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade) 2011).
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[T]he business interests and increased economic profile of the country [are]
indicators of Turkey’s increasing capacity for soft power. [There is] a promise to
push for a more active foreign policy, because it is necessitated by our history,
geography, a very active NGO community, and the business community.17
Similarly, Davutoglu (2010) frames Turkey’s new foreign policy principles as “a
new language in regional and international politics that prioritizes Turkey’s civil-
economic power”. An officer at TIKA explained Turkey’s role of soft power in
serving the business community’s material interests:
TIKA activities increase the visibility of Turkey and establish people’s trust in Tur-
key. Thus, when Turkish entrepreneurs enter into the new markets of the Middle
East and Africa, they benefit from this trust and sympathy.18
Likewise, a senior director clarified TIKA’s role in Turkish business:
Turkish businessmen follow TIKA in the Africa region. When TIKA opens up an
office in one African country, Turkish Airlines starts flights to these destinations,
which increases the interest of businessmen and simplifies their operations. For
example, in Ethiopia and Somalia you can observe such a pattern.19
While the question of whether or not there is congruence between specific TIKA
activities in countries and the strategic interests of state officers and societal actors
is beyond the scope of this study, it can be concluded that the expansion of TIKA
into the Middle East and Africa has been accompanied by the rapid increase in
exports there, particularly between 2002 and 2010. Consequently, the change in
TIKA is driven by the convergence of principled and causal beliefs, which define
social purpose, identify opportunities, frame material interests, and prescribe polit-
ical choices regarding soft power in foreign policy, and these choices are made in
conjunction with societal actors’ material interests.
Discussion: When Ideas Matter
The case of TIKA reveals important evidence regarding the conditions under
which ideas matter in foreign policy. Ideas usually exist plurally in a given set-
ting, and how precisely they function as a source for foreign policy change can
be analyzed through the type and composition of actors, material interests, and
the role of domestic structures.
Within this framework, having a core group of foreign policymakers is impor-
tant. Placing TIKA under the prime ministry after 2001 facilitated a convenient
environment for TIKA’s president, the chief advisor of foreign affairs, and the
cabinet to work together. However, although the convergence of principled
and causal beliefs reflecting ideas as exogenous to the foreign policy process is
essential, it is also contingent on particular conditions. The importance of nor-
mative values and material interests was emphasized in Davutoglu’s foreign pol-
icy vision long before he was appointed chief advisor on foreign affairs in the
AKP government (Davutoglu 1994). However, these ideas did not formally
enter the policy arena until 2003. Since 2003, the AKP empowered Davutoglu
and a team of policy intellectuals, which in turn opened a window of
opportunity for foreign policy change. The confidence and trust bestowed on
17 Quoted from Kalin’s speech titled “Recent Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy: An Assessment” and pre-
sented at the Insight Turkey Annual Conference: “Debating New Turkey” organized by the SETA Foundation on
December 3, 2010 in Washington, DC. http://setadc.org/component/content/article/34-spotlight/301-debating-
new-turkey, accessed September 2012.
18 Author’s interview with project coordinator #3 at TIKA on March 9, 2012 in Ankara.
19 Author’s interview with a senior director at TIKA on March 9, 2012 in Ankara.
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Davutoglu by Prime Minister Erdogan was evident in his appointment to the
ministry of foreign affairs as a nonelected cabinet member in May 2009. Thus,
a change in political leadership and a majority government facilitated a match
between the ideas of “policy intellectuals” and political actors and paved the
way for an interaction with the material interests of societal actors. Ozkececi-Ta-
ner (2005) focuses on “institutionalized ideas”; her findings suggest that politi-
cal actors are crucial agents to transfer ideas into foreign policymaking. She
emphasizes the previous “battle of ideas” in Turkish foreign policymaking
between political parties in the coalition governments from 1991 to 2002. The
findings in this study complement the importance of “institutionalized ideas”
and highlight the two conditions that affected the influence of a small group
of policymakers’ ideas on foreign policy in Turkey.
Accordingly, while pioneering studies on the role of ideas and norms in
international relations focus on how policy networks or epistemic communi-
ties at the transnational level impact norm transfer or social learning, which
thus alters foreign policymaking at the domestic level (Haas 1992; Risse-Kap-
pen 1994; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schemmelfennig 2001; Finnemore 2003),
this study reemphasizes the importance of domestic ideas in foreign policy as
demonstrated in other studies (Kaltenthaler 2002; Quaglia 2004; Flibbert
2006). Furthermore, elite policy intellectuals, with their unconstrained access
to political authority are observed as significant agents in the mutual constitu-
tion of normative values and material interests in foreign policy (Flibbert
2006).
On the other hand, foreign policy change cannot be adequately explained
without reference to domestic structures. Policymakers’ intersubjective under-
standings of a state’s identity, as well as discourses, norms, and institutions, are
embedded in domestic structures (Risse-Kappen 1994; Katzenstein 1996; Hopf
2002). Domestic structures vary across nations, and social facts are understood
differently across divergent social contexts. Thus, ideational forces constituting
soft power in Turkey’s foreign policy have also been filtered through domestic
structures.
For example, Davutoglu’s overall policy prescription is constituted around
conceptualizing a state identity first regionally, then globally, in coordination
with intrastate cultural, political, and economic parameters in addition to the
geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages a country inherits (Davutoglu 2001).
Kalin (2011) similarly maintains that Turkey’s new identity reconciles its cul-
tural and historical inheritance in its soft power and comprehensively commu-
nicates it in its public diplomacy activities. Therefore, the foreign policy
elite’s self-identification, particularly in Turkey’s historically configured state–
society relations and the extent of state autonomy from society in a parlia-
mentary political system, requires further research on how ideational forces
filter through domestic structures. For example, Hook’s (2008) study reveals
the importance of sharing the executive and legislative powers in the Ameri-
can presidential regime and the policy impact of societal actors’ material
interests in its domestic structures. Thus, intersubjective understanding of
state identity by the foreign policy elite should be assessed cautiously and
explored as “having [the] resources to deploy discursive power” in foreign
policy (Hopf 1998:179). The findings in this study reveal that ideational and
material forces are both in play during the foreign policy elite’s constitution
of policy change.
Last, an external shock is considered as important to create a window of
opportunity for policy entrepreneurship, which allows the influence of ideas in
foreign policy in other research studies (Flibbert 2006). However, foreign policy
change in the case of TIKA activities is observed in the absence of an external
shock or a security crisis.
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This study’s findings confirm the importance of context-dependent condi-
tionality for ideational influence. A recognized foreign policy elite, uncon-
strained access of foreign policy intellectuals to decision makers, and an
enabling political environment are specific conditions to assess when ideas
and material interests of societal actors interacting within the social context
of domestic structures matter in foreign policy. Consequently, while it is clear
that the specific conditions discussed above are necessary for ideational influ-
ence on foreign policy, it is difficult to conclude whether they are sufficient.
For Turkey, other cases under the AKP government and the previous coali-
tion governments should be examined to determine their explanatory power
in foreign policymaking.
Conclusion
This study examined the role of ideas in foreign policy change and attempted to
identify how ideas function as a source for foreign policymakers. The findings
confirm the suggested constructivist account for policy change that emphasizes
not only ideas but also material interests as exogenous factors constituted within
domestic structures. My empirical analysis in the case of TIKA reveals important
evidence demonstrating the influence of (i) shared normative values, mostly con-
stituted by the foreign policy elite’s intersubjective understanding of Turkey’s
historical roots and cultural ties in the region and (ii) material interests, favored
through the “trading state” and framed by the convergence of principled and
causal beliefs on policy change. The findings suggest that Turkey’s foreign policy
activism since the 2000s cannot adequately be explained without referencing the
convergence of specific principled and causal beliefs, which defined social
purpose, evaluated the structural environment, and framed material interests,
limiting certain foreign policy choices and legitimizing others in constituting
policy change.
Although Turkey engaged in similar foreign policy activism in the 1990s and
the early 2000s, and had similar material interests in expanding its export mar-
kets and regional power status in both decades, the significant increase in TIKA
activities in the latter decade can be attributed to the influence of ideational
forces and material interests. The turning point for policy change was the con-
vergence of strategies to advance material interests and normative ideas in deter-
mining the criteria for constituting soft power as an instrument of foreign
policy, a factor that was missing in the previous period. Incorporating business
organizations, think tanks, and civil society’s ideas and expectations into the for-
eign policy-making process is a function of using ideas to identify strategies to
serve principled beliefs and material interests, as well as legitimize political
practices.
From the findings, I conclude that ideas matter in foreign policymaking when
a set of contingent conditions is satisfied: (i) A small group of recognized for-
eign policy elite has shared normative beliefs and (ii) an enabling political envi-
ronment exists, particularly a majority government facilitating foreign policy
appointments to key positions so that a window of opportunity is provided for
policy entrepreneurship. This single case study is empirically limited, but it is
suggestive of broader patterns of policy change.
The interaction between social structures and agents of change is difficult to
assess empirically; however, the type and composition of the involved actors and
the institutional environment seem to define the contingent conditions for how
and when ideas matter. Foreign policy choices are made not only with future
results in mind, but are also informed by normative concerns about how choices
should be made. In light of the empirical analysis and discussion illustrated
above, it can be argued that the logic of appropriateness and the logic of
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consequences have both played a part in the behavior of Turkey’s foreign policy
elite. Still, the context-dependent conditions for the influence of ideational
forces require further research to determine how they play out in other states
and issue areas.
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